Executive summary: Ukraine’s long- and intermediate-range strike campaigns against Russian energy and logistics infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine are causing significant effects on the Russian economy and impacting Russia’s ability to sustain its frontline military efforts in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have recently intensified these coordinated strike campaigns, causing severe gasoline shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine. Ukraine’s strike campaigns are causing Russia to lose petrochemical export revenue that could have gone toward its war effort and are starting to impact Russia’s frontline logistics. The Kremlin is implementing an array of temporary mitigations to try to ensure sufficient gasoline flows to the domestic market and to address problems facing consumers while downplaying the severity of the wide-scale gasoline shortages and projecting a facade of stability. The Kremlin will likely fail to address the direct cause of the gasoline shortages — Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure —because the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and military are likely unable to rapidly strengthen Russia’s air defense umbrella to cover the frontline and its vast rear simultaneously. Ukrainian forces will likely be able to continue — if not escalate — their long-range strike campaign until Russia is able to find a solution to its air defense insufficiencies. Ukraine’s strike campaigns against Russian petrochemical infrastructure and logistics will likely continue to degrade Russia’s struggling wartime economy and have growing consequences on Russia’s frontline operations in the future. The Kremlin has repeatedly underestimated Ukraine and failed to prepare its defenses against attacks in past years, and such miscalculations are vulnerabilities that Ukraine has exploited and can continue to exploit.
Ukrainian forces have recently intensified their coordinated long- and intermediate-range strike campaigns against energy and logistics infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine — a campaign that has been ongoing since early 2024. Ukrainian long-range strikes have consistently targeted oil refineries in Russia since early 2024, but Ukrainian forces have intensified their campaign against Russian oil refining, production, processing, storage, distribution, and export facilities since March 2026.[1] Ukrainian forces have struck 22 Russian oil refineries between the beginning of 2026 and June 30, striking oil infrastructure targets as far as 2,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian border.[2] Ukrainian forces are also conducting an intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics arteries throughout occupied Ukraine to disrupt Russia’s ability to transport oil and refined product among other objectives. Ukrainian forces have increased their intermediate-range strikes against oil infrastructure in occupied Crimea, including oil depots, storage facilities, and transshipment nodes.[3] Ukrainian long-range strikes against oil infrastructure are systematically disrupting Russia’s ability to produce fuel and are creating gasoline shortages throughout Russia and in occupied Ukraine, while the intermediate-range strike campaign is further hindering Russia’s ability to move these limited gasoline supplies to occupied areas of Ukraine.
The intensifying gasoline shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine are significantly impacting the lives of ordinary citizens. The number of Russian federal subjects experiencing gasoline shortages and sales restrictions has been steadily increasing since mid-June, with shortages in occupied Crimea beginning as early as late May 2026.[4] Occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts have also experienced gasoline shortages and had to implement sales restrictions.[5] The decreasing gasoline supply in Russia and occupied Ukraine has led to high demand and rising prices, with long lines forming at gas stations.[6] Russian regional governments and gas station companies have imposed gasoline and diesel sales restrictions since the beginning of June in an effort to curb the rising consumer demand.[7] Approximately 78 out of Russia’s 83 federal subjects have experienced fuel shortages, with Russian authorities in 48 Russian federal subjects imposing official gasoline and diesel purchasing limits.[8] ISW has not yet observed evidence of fuel restrictions in the Republic of Ingushetia, the Republic of Kalmykia, the Chechen Republic, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, and Nenets Autonomous Okrug, but Russian gasoline shortages will likely spread to those regions in the near future.
The Ukrainian strike campaigns are causing Russia to lose petrochemical export revenue that could have gone toward its war effort. Ukrainian forces repeatedly targeted Russian oil transshipment infrastructure near the Baltic Sea in Leningrad Oblast in April 2026, restricting Russia’s ability to export oil and causing a decline in oil revenues.[9] Putin confirmed on June 28 that Russian authorities temporarily imposed a complete ban on gasoline and jet fuel exports and are considering imposing a short-term ban on diesel exports.[10] Ukraine’s strikes are reducing Russia’s ability to export fuel, depriving Moscow of the chance to fully benefit from the rise in global oil prices in the past few months due to the war in the Middle East. The Kremlin is also importing fuel from other states to offset its shortages — further dipping into the Kremlin’s coffers and reducing the money available for the war. Russian crude oil exports increased in June 2026 compared to June 2025, as Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries left more crude oil available for shipment.[11]
Ukraine’s long- and intermediate-range strike campaigns are starting to impact Russia’s frontline logistics. Ukraine has been heavily targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) throughout occupied southern and eastern Ukraine in recent months, including by striking fuel tankers along the M-14 highway connecting occupied Berdyansk and Mariupol in Ukraine to Rostov-on-Don in Russia.[12] Russian authorities may be prioritizing gasoline supplies to the military over the civilian population to reduce the impact of the gasoline shortages on military operations. The Russian military relies more heavily on diesel than gasoline, moreover. Russia is experiencing decreased diesel output due to Ukrainian strikes on Russian petrochemical infrastructure, with production falling by one million metric tons in April 2026 and another 600,000 metric tons in May 2026.[13] Some Russian regions have restricted the sale of diesel as well as gasoline.[14] The Russian military may be experiencing diesel shortages as well, which would affect Russia’s ability to use vehicles to move supplies to the frontline. Such diesel shortages would exacerbate the supply issues Russian forces are starting to face due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian vehicles operating on major GLOCs in occupied Ukraine. Russian forces appear to be facing fuel supply issues in the Lyman direction, and deliveries of ammunition and drones have reportedly decreased in the Hulyaipole direction, for example.[15]
The Kremlin is implementing an array of temporary solutions to try to ensure sufficient gasoline flows to the domestic market and to reduce problems facing consumers. The Kremlin is resorting to a number of temporary efforts to fix the shortage issues beyond the sales restrictions that many Russian regions and gas stations have put in place. Russia is importing gasoline and jet fuel from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and India to compensate for decreases in Russia’s own fuel production.[16] Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on June 28 that Russia is tapping its gasoline reserves, leveraging its small and medium oil refineries to supplement production at large refineries, shortening routine maintenance at some oil refineries, and postponing scheduled maintenance.[17] The Russian Duma approved amendments allowing lower-quality, below-standard fuel to enter the market, and Russian regional officials have proposed invoking price caps (a legally enforced maximum price) at gas stations in Russia and occupied Crimea to mollify consumers.[18] Russian consumer demand for gasoline will likely continue to increase despite these temporary measures, however, given the widespread panic that has taken hold and seasonal summertime demand spikes. Potential price caps would transfer the cost burden of the shortages from consumers to suppliers, which may further complicate and decrease the supply available as gas stations struggle with profit. Many of these mitigation efforts are only effective in the short-term and do not address the actual supply issues in the longer-term.
The Kremlin has been downplaying the severity of the wide-scale gasoline shortages to project a facade of stability. Putin acknowledged on June 28 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure are creating problems, including long lines at gas stations.[19] Putin referred to the domestic gasoline shortages as “not critical,” however, downplaying their severity while trying to show that he is cognizant of the economic and social struggles people in Russia and occupied Ukraine are facing. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also recently claimed that the current situation with the Russian fuel market is challenging but manageable.[20] Novak alleged that Russia has sufficient fuel reserves for the domestic market and is merely restructuring fuel market logistics to meet “artificially” increased fuel demands.[21] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov blamed the shortages on global oil price irregularities, which Peskov claimed are not unique to Russia.[22]
The Kremlin will likely fail to address the direct cause of the shortages — Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure — due to the inability of Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) and military to rapidly strengthen its air defense umbrella to cover the frontline and its vast rear simultaneously. The solutions the Kremlin is implementing are temporary and are addressing the symptoms, not the problem itself. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign is the actual cause of the shortages, while Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign is exacerbating the supply issues in occupied Ukraine. Ukraine’s long-range strikes are reaching deeper into Russia than ever before, and Ukraine has also been conducting a suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign against Russian air defenses closer to the frontline and in the operational rear.[23] These strike campaigns have dramatically increased Russia’s need for more air defenses to cover a wider swathe of territory. Putin acknowledged on June 28 that Russia needs to better coordinate its air defenses at all levels and structures and expressed confidence in Russia’s ability to sufficiently boost its production of air defense systems — although it is far from clear that Russia can do so quickly.[24] Ukraine’s repeated strikes against the same targets and Ukraine’s ability to successfully strike some of Russia’s most heavily protected areas, like Moscow City not long after Victory Day and St. Petersburg during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), indicate that Russia lacks a sufficient number of air defense systems to cover even critically important rear areas.[25] Reports that Russia may be experiencing shortages of various types of air defense missiles, possibly due to Western sanctions that are limiting Russia’s access to key components, suggest that the Russian DIB will not be able to quickly and sufficiently increase its air defense system production in accordance with Putin’s directives.[26] The recruitment of air defenders to protect Russia’s rear will also compete with recruitment for the frontline.
Ukrainian forces will likely be able to continue — if not escalate — their long-range strike campaign until Russia is able to find a solution to its air defense insufficiencies. Ukraine has been able to intensify its long-range strike campaign in 2026 due to a number of factors. Ukraine has boosted its domestic drone production to allow Ukrainian forces to increase the size and frequency of their strike packages.[27] Ukraine has increased the payloads of its drones so that they can cause more damage.[28] Ukraine has systemically degraded Russia’s air defense infrastructure, identifying gaps and finding strike corridors to ensure that Ukrainian drones reach their targets.[29] Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) will likely be able to maintain its current production levels, allowing Ukraine to continue the current tempo of strikes if Russia is unable to find sufficient defensive countermeasures. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on June 25 a 40-day intermediate- and long-range strike campaign that aims to influence Russia to end the war in Ukraine, indicating that Ukraine is planning to continue or even intensify this campaign in the coming weeks.[30] The Kremlin may decide to move some of its limited air defense resources to protect certain high-priority energy facilities in the rear, but Russia’s available air defenses are unlikely to be able to protect all of the infrastructure necessary to defend against the Ukrainian strike campaigns. Gasoline demand will likely decrease naturally in the fall, which could mitigate some of the challenges facing the Kremlin but will not eliminate the main driver of the shortages in the first place —Ukraine’s strike campaign.
Ukraine’s strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and logistics in Russia will likely continue to degrade Russia’s struggling wartime economy and will have growing consequences for Russia’s frontline operations. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has reduced the overall Russian refining capacity and fuel production.[31] The Kremlin’s attempts to mitigate the shortages will fail if they cannot systematically strengthen Russia’s air defense infrastructure. Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure will therefore continue to strain Russian energy revenues, undercut Russia’s ability to profit from increased global oil price spikes, and prevent Russia from using those profits to finance its war in Ukraine.[32] Ukraine’s strike campaign is generating compounding effects by cutting Russian petrochemical export profits and forcing the Russian government to subsidize lower gas prices while the Russian budget continues to grapple with high defense spending.[33] The intensifying gasoline shortages will likely contribute to the broader inflationary pressures on the Russian economy and complicate the Kremlin’s efforts to implement expansionary monetary policies, including lowering the key interest rate.[34]
The strike campaigns may impact Russian military capabilities on the battlefield in Ukraine in the near future. The severity of these effects remains unclear, however, particularly if Russian authorities are prioritizing gasoline and diesel supplies to the military. Ukraine’s ability to increasingly deny Russia the use of Crimea and southern Ukraine for the transport of fuel and other supplies will add to the challenges facing Russian forces by preventing them from bringing up vehicles, transporting cargo, and using generators. Russian efforts to recruit for rear area mobile fire teams and other air defenders will have to compete with Russia’s needs for resources and monetary payments for recruits for frontline operations and the newly established Russian Unmanned Systems Forces. Russia’s generally declining recruitment rate is additionally adding pressure on these various recruitment drives.[35]
Russia has repeatedly failed to prepare its defenses against attacks as it has underestimated Ukraine’s offensive capabilities. Russia’s miscalculations are a vulnerability Ukraine has exploited and can continue to exploit. Russia faced a similar yet less severe fuel shortage crisis at the end of the summer in 2025, largely due to Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries.[36] Ukrainian forces intensified their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries in August 2025 and struck 16 out of Russia’s 38 oil refineries by October 2025.[37] At least 57 out of Russia’s 83 regions experienced gasoline shortages by the middle of October 2025.[38] The Kremlin failed to address its air defense issues in late 2025 and into early 2026 despite the 2025 shortages and continued strikes against the Russian rear.
Russia similarly underestimated Ukrainian capabilities in the lead-up to Ukraine’s Kursk incursion in 2024 and failed to protect its territory from Ukrainian attacks. Russian authorities were reportedly aware of a possible Ukrainian attack into Kursk Oblast starting in late 2023 but failed to act.[39] Border units were nevertheless not fully staffed; Russia relied heavily on conscripts to man these units, and fortifications were sparsely manned and poorly equipped.[40] The Kremlin did not view its border regions as frontline areas and did not adequately defend its border from ground attacks, confident that Ukraine could not attack in these areas.[41]
Ukraine’s ability to identify and exploit Russian vulnerabilities and the Kremlin’s pattern of failing to recognize and address those vulnerabilities in a timely fashion give Kyiv important advantages that it will likely be able to retain for some considerable time.
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https://t.me/agentstvonews/15990; https://kaluga dot aif dot ru/auto/trans/v-ulyanovskom-okruge-kaluzhskoy-oblasti-otmenili-vse-avtobusnye-reysy?ysclid=mqt460bdc424879635; https://newstulan dot ru/fn_1892890.html?ysclid=mqt4a97s4s599074629; https://t.me/severrealii/33639;
[8] https://t.me/muratkumpilov/20381; https://t.me/astrapress/116607; https://t.me/tass_agency/382209; https://t.me/turchak_andrey/6773; https://t.me/sotaproject/114942; https://t.me/idelrealii/45465 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/382902; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96407 ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27849387 ; https://t.me/belpepel/21400; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8763245; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117710; https://t.me/E_V_Kovalchuk/818; https://t.me/astrapress/116562; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/14/tatneft-ogranichila-prodazhu-benzina-v-neskolkih-regionah-rossii; https://ngs42 dot ru/text/auto/2026/06/14/76478019/; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8737438; https://newsnn dot ru/news/2026-06-13/ne-bolee-20-litrov-i-tolko-za-nalichku-ogranicheniya-vveli-na-azs-v-nizhnem-novgorode-5616618?utm_source=t.me&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=t.me&utm_referrer=t.me; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/50914 ; https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1096191 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/16/tatneft-vvela-ogranicheniya-na-prodazhu-topliva-na-vseh-zapravkah-v-rossii; https://t.me/idelrealii/45371; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10855; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96084 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96091 ; https://t.me/severrealii/33581;https://t.me/andriyshTime/60555 ; https://t.me/astrapress/115853 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102014; https://t.me/astrapress/116589; https://t.me/severrealii/33629 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/1701; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2069153026766467380 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2069153034450370626; https://t.me/astrapress/117088; https://t.me/istories_media/12692; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/55517; https://t.me/dailykarelia/22834; https://karelia.rbc dot ru/karelia/03/06/2026/6a2036609a7947e329d1f0b4; https://vk dot com/wall-176556660_749260; https://t.me/astrapress/114739 ; https://ru dot themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/23/ogranicheniya-na-prodazhu-benzina-vveli-v-glavnom-neftyanom-regione-rossii-a198929; https://suspilne dot media/1338104-deficit-palnogo-ohopiv-golovni-naftovi-regioni-rf/; https://t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/65439; http://rbc dot ru/economics/23/06/2026/6a3a04ec9a7947915661d20b?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=messenger&utm_campaign=rbc_news&utm_content=6a3a04ec9a7947915661d20b&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Ft.me%2F; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8762515; https://t.me/nvrskadm/53826 ; https://t.me/mcu_krd/15248; https://t.me/sotaproject/115197; https://t.me/tvknew/79108; https://t.me/sibrealii/37607; https://t.me/idelrealii/45427; https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c20yx729vlvo; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96414 ; https://t.me/Hinshtein/18602; https://t.me/astrapress/116560; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96409 ; https://t.me/paperpaper_ru/69017; https://t.me/igor_artamonov48/6966; https://t.me/astrapress/116607; https://t.me/meduzalive/143118; https://t.me/andriyshTime/61341; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/eho-udarov-po-npz-tatarstan-i-drugie-regiony-povolzhjya-ohvatil-toplivnyy-krizis/33781581.html; https://t.me/idelrealii/45370; https://t.me/TravnikovAndrey/3113; https://t.me/andriyshTime/61198; https://t.me/idelrealii/45427; https://t.me/sotaproject/114895; https://t.me/astrapress/116504; https://t.me/HocenkoVP/8377; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117654; https://t.me/andriyshTime/61791 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/51423; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96638; https://t.me/bazabazon/47144; https://t.me/severrealii/33669 ; https://meduza.io/news/2026/06/29/v-orlovskoy-oblasti-nachnut-prodavat-benzin-po-nomeram-mashin; https://t.me/omelnichenko/10251; https://t.me/andriyshTime/61215; https://t.me/idelrealii/45429; https://t.me/sotaproject/114903; https://t.me/astrapress/116516 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96378; https://primorsky dot ru/news/318665 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/115138 ; https://t.me/astrapress/117022; https://primamedia dot ru/news/2541292/; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/29/v-primorskom-krae-vveli-ogranicheniya-na-prodazhu-topliva-dlya-fur-potomu-chto-voditeli-nabirayut-do-tysyachi-tonn-potom-ot-ezzhayut-otlivayut-i-snova-zapravlyayutsya; https://t.me/guberniaband/14012; https://t.me/tass_agency/382880; https://t.me/fedorishchev_official/1079; https://t.me/idelrealii/45370; https://t.me/tass_agency/381924; https://t.me/idelrealii/45429; https://t.me/andriyshTime/60329; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10841; https://t.me/astrapress/115506 ; https://t.me/astrapress/115519 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/53616; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/55517; https://vk dot com/wall-60130670_7756307?w=wall-60130670_7756307; https://www dot kommersant.ru/doc/8765450 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96501 ; https://t.me/astrapress/116797; https://t.me/istories_media/12637; https://xn—–6kcalbbrfn0iijf7msb dot xn--p1ai/news/obshchestvo/v-tveri-i-tverskoy-oblasti-ogranichena-prodazha-benzina/; https://t.me/astrapress/116541 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117706 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96395; https://t.me/tass_agency/382092; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2066842362626687395; https://t.me/s/ejdailyru ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/60589 ; https://t.me/depeconom89/1807; https://t.me/astrapress/116607; https://vk dot com/publicamrborzya?w=wall-200033121_5800&ysclid=mqt1puth2c78917858; https://t.me/agentstvonews/15990; https://kaluga dot aif dot ru/auto/trans/v-ulyanovskom-okruge-kaluzhskoy-oblasti-otmenili-vse-avtobusnye-reysy?ysclid=mqt460bdc424879635; https://newstulan dot ru/fn_1892890.html?ysclid=mqt4a97s4s599074629; https://t.me/severrealii/33639;
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://www.ft.com/content/d49e288f-b74e-44a8-a2f3-ec87f7cb5c27; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-31/russia-s-oil-exports-plunge-as-drone-strikes-cripple-baltic-ports; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/
[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80174
[11] https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/refined-products/070226-refinery-attacks-boost-june-russian-crude-exports-dampen-products
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/; https://x.com/azov_media/status/2058821715979886861?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35955; https://x.com/aroslav24470/status/2058864161359003784; https://t.me/azov_media/8362 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2058822564101689815; https://x.com/markito0171/status/2058817707160596820; https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2058883086952067198; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2058934949017714794; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2058925932207866133; https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2058896061708574798; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2058829052807373099; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35942; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2394; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2026/
[13] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-diesel-output-falls-further-10-may-after-drone-attacks-data-analysis-2026-05-29/
[14] https://t.me/turchak_andrey/6773; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96407 ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27849387 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8763245; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117710; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/14/tatneft-ogranichila-prodazhu-benzina-v-neskolkih-regionah-rossii; https://ngs42 dot ru/text/auto/2026/06/14/76478019/; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8737438; https://newsnn dot ru/news/2026-06-13/ne-bolee-20-litrov-i-tolko-za-nalichku-ogranicheniya-vveli-na-azs-v-nizhnem-novgorode-5616618?utm_source=t.me&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=t.me&utm_referrer=t.me; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/50914; https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1096191 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/16/tatneft-vvela-ogranicheniya-na-prodazhu-topliva-na-vseh-zapravkah-v-rossii; https://t.me/idelrealii/45371; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10855; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96084 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96091 ; https://t.me/severrealii/33581;https://t.me/andriyshTime/60555 ; https://t.me/astrapress/115853 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102014; https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1096191 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/16/tatneft-vvela-ogranicheniya-na-prodazhu-topliva-na-vseh-zapravkah-v-rossii; https://t.me/idelrealii/45371; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10855; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96084 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96091 ; https://t.me/severrealii/33581;https://t.me/andriyshTime/60555 ; https://t.me/astrapress/115853 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/102014; https://t.me/andriyshTime/60620 ; https://t.me/ekho_dagestana1/24679; https://t.me/sotaproject/114729 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/23/ogranicheniya-na-prodazhu-benzina-vveli-v-sibiri-i-saratovskoy-oblasti ; https://t.me/astrapress/116478 ;https://t.me/astrapress/116529; https://t.me/astrapress/116479 ; https://t.me/HocenkoVP/8377 ; https://t.me/kobzevii/16098 ; https://t.me/busargin_r/11648 ; https://suspilne dot media/1337432-vlada-rf-prodovzue-obmezuvati-rozdribnij-prodaz-palnogo-na-azs/; https://t.me/tass_agency/381943; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96368; https://t.me/astrapress/117088; https://ru dot themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/23/ogranicheniya-na-prodazhu-benzina-vveli-v-glavnom-neftyanom-regione-rossii-a198929; https://suspilne dot media/1338104-deficit-palnogo-ohopiv-golovni-naftovi-regioni-rf/; https://t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/65439; http://rbc dot ru/economics/23/06/2026/6a3a04ec9a7947915661d20b?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=messenger&utm_campaign=rbc_news&utm_content=6a3a04ec9a7947915661d20b&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Ft.me%2F; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8762515; https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c20yx729vlvo; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96414 ; https://t.me/meduzalive/143118; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/13/na-moskovskih-azs-vveli-ogranicheniya-na-prodazhu-benzina; https://t.me/bloodysx/56454; https://t.me/istories_media/12524; https://www.fontanka dot ru/2026/06/13/76477473/; https://t.me/supernova_plus/53616; https://t.me/rusnews/86225; https://t.me/AoMurmansk/36883; https://t.me/sotaproject/114921; https://gov-murman dot ru/info/news/570051/; https://t.me/astrapress/116645; https://t.me/HocenkoVP/8377; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117654; https://t.me/omelnichenko/10251; https://t.me/andriyshTime/61215; https://t.me/idelrealii/45429; https://t.me/sotaproject/114903; https://t.me/astrapress/116516 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96378; https://t.me/tass_agency/382215 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/382092; https://t.me/astrapress/116541 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/117706 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/96395
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/; https://suspilne dot media/1337322-sili-oboroni-vdarili-po-zavodu-v-rf-v-krimu-pocali-vvoditi-grafiki-vidklucenna-svitla-1581-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1782206718&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/06/23/hodyat-pishky-50-kilometriv-nosyat-na-sobi-snaryady-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku-trishhyt-vorozha-logistyka/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2026/; https://pro dot rbc.ru/demo/6a3e60879a7947a15c0665ae; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-asks-kazakhstan-gasoline-ease-shortages-sources-say-2026-06-24/; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-import-gasoline-by-sea-shortage-looms-sources-say-2026-06-17/; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-buys-gasoline-india-tackle-shortages-sources-say-2026-07-01/
[17] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80174
[18] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-parliament-approves-tax-changes-address-fuel-shortages-2026-06-24/; https://sozd.duma.gov dot ru/bill/1155876-8; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/06/15/rossiyskim-npz-na-fone-defitsita-topliva-razreshili-proizvodit-benzin-bolee-nizkogo-kachestva; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8737731?from=top_main_1; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80174
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[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2026/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80176
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