Anders Behring Breivik​ said that the massacres he committed in Oslo and on the island of Utøya in July 2011 were ‘marketing’ for his manifesto, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, which was in turn marketing for future massacres. Breivik declared ‘pre-emptive war on all Cultural Marxist/multiculturalist elites’ who, he claimed, had contrived the ruin of Europe. These ‘Cultural Marxists’, beginning with the Sardinian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci and the Hungarian communist György Lukács, and continuing with the Frankfurt School, had waged an insidious war on the West and the patriarchal family in an effort to liquidate the strongholds of resistance to communism. The doctrines of this power bloc had inflicted ‘mental illness’ on Europeans and feminised the men of the continent. There was no limit to the revenge Breivik had in mind: the mass execution of ‘traitors’, anthrax attacks, even nuclear strikes.

Most of his manifesto was made up of borrowings from European fascists, right-wing American think tanks and the Islamophobia industry. The idea of a Cultural Marxist plot came from a volume of writings on ‘political correctness’ published in 2004 by the Free Congress Foundation in the US, edited by the military theorist William S. Lind and including essays by him, his anticommunist colleague Raymond V. Raehn and Reagan’s former adviser T. Kenneth Gibb Jr. Another member of Lind’s circle was the New Right activist Paul Weyrich, who had contributed to a similar volume in 1997. Weyrich, who coined the phrase ‘moral majority’ and had been building the organisational infrastructure of the Christian right since the 1960s, wrote in 1999 that the culture war had been lost to an ‘alien ideology’, and conservatives should go on a monastic retreat in order to preserve what was left of their culture.

Who were the Cultural Marxists in reality? They were the losers of the 20th century: defeated, jailed, murdered or exiled. Although the Western Marxists, as they are usually called, became known for their melancholy retreat from the practical problems of political struggle, their agenda originally developed, as Russell Jacoby explains in Dialectic of Defeat (1981), out of a practical engagement with the problems of defeat. Rosa Luxemburg and left communists such as Anton Pannekoek, Paul Levi and Karl Korsch confronted the catastrophe of the First World War: workers marching without resistance to the killing fields, urged on by the Marxist parties of the Second International, which had promised to oppose war. Lukács wrote History and Class Consciousness (1923) after the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, in which he served as the people’s commissar for education and culture. Gramsci composed his Prison Notebooks in a fascist jail. The classic works of the Frankfurt School, such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) and Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964), were written in exile after the Second World War, in the shadow of Stalinism.

Though they differed in approach, all of these writers stressed what Luxemburg saw as the neglected ‘subjective factor of the socialist transformation’: the element of popular consciousness and the cultural power of capitalism. None of them thought of culture simply as an instrument of domination; neither did they treat it as a specialised domain of artistic production. Lukács understood reification – the process by which a collectively produced living world appears to those inhabiting it as a purely objective, dead reality – as an outcome of the logic of the commodity form, whereby, as Marx described, relations between people appear as relations between things. Gramsci understood hegemony not as coercion but as a practice of moral and cultural leadership that made use of aspects of popular common sense and everyday experience. In Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer argued that reason, which had promised to disenchant the world and liberate humanity, had become a tool of domination, culminating in the administered rationality of the concentration camp. Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man gloomily described a postwar capitalism organised around technological control and the endless manufacturing of needs to be satisfied, resulting in the near annihilation of the critical space between what is and what might be – hence ‘one-dimensional’. According to this expansive, if increasingly pessimistic, approach to culture, the unfolding logic of capitalism rather than any malign conspiracy served to secure its dominance. There is something darkly comic in the idea that this historically disarmed, if intellectually influential, tendency was a conspiracy to engineer the downfall of Western culture. Weyrich and his confederates were cowering before a scarecrow.

How, and by whom, was this scarecrow manufactured? The Cultural Marxism conspiracy theory bears obvious similarities to Nazi theories of Kulturbolschewismus (cultural Bolshevism). Both treat a group of intellectuals, most of them Jewish, as a conclave of rootless heretics, and blame them for the pathologies of cultural modernity and the dissolution of traditional authority. But despite these ‘eerie parallels’, A.J.A. Woods shows in The Cultural Marxism Conspiracy that the theory has more surprising origins: not in interwar fascism, but in Trotskyist sectarian groups, late 1960s intra-left fratricide, and the first stirrings of the cult of a man called Lyndon LaRouche. Blending sophisticated theory with research in the archives, Woods explains how a cluster of ideas originally connected to sect-building became the core doctrine of a rightward-moving cult, found a receptive audience in the Free Congress Foundation (founded by Weyrich), were subsequently taken up by the Tea Party, and have since become a mainstay of the Trump movement and reactionary currents more generally.

Woods, a cultural materialist in the tradition of Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall and the Birmingham School of cultural studies, employs a method of ‘conjunctural analysis’, on the model of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, examining the constellations of power, struggle and ideology that made the idea of Cultural Marxism intelligible in various situations, and showing how, with each new conjuncture, the theory was retooled for new audiences.

The risk of such an approach is that, applied too stringently, it might dissolve the object of analysis into its contexts. We would gain a precise account of the ideological work the theory does but lose any critical standard against which to judge it – leaving us with little more than moral outrage or mere fact-checking. But in Woods’s analysis there is also a strand of immanent critique: not only are real social interests and political strategies involved here, but real conceptual stakes. This is the reason Woods refuses to dismiss Cultural Marxism as a conspiracy theory. However cynical and obtuse today’s purveyors of Cultural Marxism theory may be, they are trying to apprehend realities that they cannot grasp by other means. In effect, Woods turns the tables on these theorists. The Marxism they revile – actually existing cultural Marxism – is more capable of explaining their conspiracy theory than their conspiracy theory is of explaining actually existing cultural Marxism.

On​ 17 June 1969, the German radical Daniel Cohn-Bendit interrupted a lecture by Herbert Marcuse at the Teatro Eliseo in Rome, demanding to know why he was taking money from the CIA. Marcuse – by then teaching at the new University of California campus at San Diego – had worked for the Office of Strategic Studies, the precursor of the CIA, during the war, after fleeing the Nazis. The West German journalist Leo Matthias had spun this into an accusation that Marcuse was still a government asset and was now working to defang the student movement. This stirred up a witch-hunt, and the charge was taken up in the US by Progressive Labour, the magazine of the Maoist Progressive Labour Party, which added that Marcuse promoted ‘love-ins’ to distract students from effective political work.

The attack was a crude sectarian tactic. Marcuse, rethinking his former pessimism, hoped that the student movement of the 1960s would be the catalyst for a general confrontation with capitalism. Where they led, workers would follow. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) had, since its launch in 1960, grown to be a hundred thousand strong. After a decade of activism around civil rights and the Vietnam War, some bloody encounters with police (students were bludgeoned outside the Democratic Convention in Chicago and at Columbia University in New York, and Black students had been killed when highway patrolmen fired on protesters in Orangeburg, South Carolina), and with Nixon now in power, SDS was considering revolutionary possibilities. Progressive Labour, which organised in SDS through a front called the Worker Student Alliance, thought Marcuse’s idea impossible and dangerous. Students were too sympathetic to ‘nationalist’ tendencies like the Black Panthers and the Viet Minh: they must instead ‘proletarianise’ themselves and help build working-class struggle on the shop floor.

This was a laborious debate, but accusations of treachery sliced neatly through the complexity. When SDS split in 1969, the majority rallied behind the ‘revolutionary youth movement’ that became the Weather Underground. The rest joined Progressive Labour, which ground them down into a battle-weathered core. This is the first conjuncture Woods picks out: the strategic dilemmas of a radical movement running out of steam.

In New York, a new SDS faction was emerging around a vain, charismatic intellectual called Lyn Marcus, whose real name was Lyndon LaRouche. LaRouche, who loathed Marcuse, had set up shop in the Free School of New York, run by Progressive Labour’s student wing from a room above a café on East 14th Street, where he delivered an ‘elementary course in Marxist economics’. His goal was to select and mould an intellectual elite, a Marxist intelligentsia, made up of young and highly committed students. This faction became the National Caucus of Labour Committees (NCLC), notorious for its monomaniacal hatred of the Frankfurt School, whose members had by then moved back to Germany and which was, as letters between Adorno and Marcuse reveal, bitterly hostile to the student movement. The LaRouchites painted the Frankfurt School as a CIA-backed psychological warfare operation. They claimed that, while studying radio propaganda for the Rockefeller-funded Princeton Radio Research Project, Adorno had worked out how to use commercial radio as a weapon of mass hypnosis. Even his fondness for Schoenberg’s atonal music – which he argued escaped the commodified and conformist aesthetics of the culture industry – was seen as part of the same agenda: atonality, like rock music, would derange the masses. If culture was not a tool of domination for the Western Marxists, it definitely was for the LaRouchites.

As in any sect, Woods writes, the doctrine of the LaRouche cult bore scarcely any relation to the real conditions in which it existed. It was, in Gramsci’s terms, an ‘arbitrary ideology’, emerging from the ‘formally constructive will of one personality’. It socialised its members into subservience, reinforced by gruelling ‘ego-stripping’ sessions and ‘deprogramming’ exercises, which were ostensibly intended to aid the formation of a disciplined revolutionary intelligentsia. In the LaRouchites’ increasingly arcane terminology, a new dark age was being readied by a stygian ‘Aristotelian counter-elite’ including Henry Kissinger, Noam Chomsky and the royal family, which used rock music, drugs and sex to sedate the masses and demolish Western culture. Especially loathsome was the promotion by Marcuse and other ‘left-fascists’ of ‘homosexual practices’, supposedly a ruse intended to reduce people to their bestial urges. LaRouche opposed this decadent conspiracy with his revolutionary elite, which, as he moved to the right, morphed into a ‘neoplatonist elite’. Instead of the working class, they spoke of ‘sheep’; instead of socialism, they extolled Western civilisation and German culture in particular.

By the late 1970s, the LaRouchites had started to gain some notoriety, but also some real influence on the right. In 1974, LaRouche established the Fusion Energy Foundation, which championed nuclear fusion and particle beams as essential to the defence of the US. Several of Ronald Reagan’s national security officials, who had similar enthusiasms, later admitted to having met LaRouche to discuss this. There were already strong resonances between the LaRouchite worldview and that of the emerging New Right coalition of neoconservatives, neoliberals, the campus right, Southern segregationists and Christian evangelicals. All of them were appalled by the 1960s counterculture, despised the radical left and attributed the political chaos of the time to cultural decay and immorality. Where the LaRouche cult blamed the Frankfurt School, the right blamed the liberal establishment. And while LaRouche was preparing philosopher-kings to guide the sheep, people like Weyrich and the direct-mail pioneer Richard Viguerie looked to think tanks and mass communications as a way of doing politics while avoiding the blue-blood Republican establishment.

By the early​ 1990s a new conjuncture had come about. The Reagan counter-revolution hadn’t made a dent on the culture of the US, which was becoming more liberal. The paleoconservative right, a mutation within the New Right which rejected neoconservatism in favour of the staunch nationalism, moral traditionalism and anti-immigrant America First policies that would later characterise Trumpism, blamed students for this. A run of rightist bestsellers, from Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind (1987) and Roger Kimball’s Tenured Radicals (1990) to Dinesh D’Souza’s Illiberal Education (1991), taught the public that the campuses were controlled by leftist thought police, and that traditional racist and sexist sentiments were now inexpressible. The media obligingly backed them up: press mentions of ‘political correctness’ climbed from fifteen in 1989 to nearly seven thousand by 1994.

The connection between the LaRouche cult and the paleoconservatives was an obscure essay by Michael J. Minnicino, published in 1992 in the cult’s little-read magazine Fidelio, which reworked LaRouchean tropes into an argument about ‘political correctness’. Anticipating many of the fallacies of later literature on Cultural Marxism, it began by splicing together phrases from Lukács’s early, gloomy writings on literature to produce an image of a veritable Antichrist. Phrases from The Theory of the Novel were made to sound like recommendations that people be made to feel ‘abandoned by God’ so that ‘demonic’ forces could be unleashed. Lukács was so vile that when he joined the Hungarian Communist Party he had written: ‘Who will save us from Western civilisation?’ In fact, he said this at the outbreak of the First World War, years before he became a communist. The question then reappears in the 1962 preface to Theory of the Novel in which Lukács denounces the Frankfurt School as pampered guests at the Grand Hotel Abyss, contemplating the void in comfort.

Minnicino’s essay went on to regurgitate the claim that Adorno’s diagnosis of culture industry conformism was in fact a programme for conformity, and his theory of the ‘authoritarian personality’ an agenda for psychological conditioning. Marcuse, whose Eros and Civilisation (1955) sought the liberation of eros from capitalist repression, was said to be the architect of ‘contentless adolescent sexual rebellion’. But his analysis had little to do with sexual rebellion. Eros and Civilisation, a speculative reading of Freud against himself, agreed with Freud that all civilisation entailed some instinctual renunciation. But he argued that capitalism required an additional repression specific to its particular power structures and organised by the ‘performance principle’ which shackled the body to alienated labour. To liberate eros was to eroticise social life in its most expansive sense, turning work into play, uniting humans with one another and reconciling humanity with nature. In fact, in One-Dimensional Man Marcuse had warned against a type of ‘repressive desublimation’ in which sexuality was selectively ‘liberated’ in ways that were socially constructive for capitalism. This, for Minnicino, was the intellectual basis of a ‘permanent revolution’ which deranged students and ‘overwhelmed’ campuses with ‘Comintern-style’ political correctness.

This text reached the larger and more moneyed audience of the hard right largely by accident. Copies of Fidelio, sent out to conservative think tanks in an attempt to find patrons, fell into the hands of Raymond Raehn, who in 1996 worked Minnicino’s essay up into an unpublished – and now lost – paper, ‘Critical Theory: A Special Research Report’, and passed it to his friend William S. Lind, a reactionary alumnus of the liberal Dartmouth College, a former defence analyst for the Republican senator Robert Taft and director of the Free Congress Foundation’s Centre for Cultural Conservatism. Lind had coined the term ‘Cultural Marxism’ in a co-authored article published in 1994 in the Marine Corps Gazette, where he defined it, with admirable economy, as ‘Marxism translated from economic into social and cultural terms’.

In a later essay, ‘Who Stole Our Culture?’, Lind traced the origins of the menace back to Gramsci, who had ‘laid out a strategy for destroying Christianity and Western culture’. Instead of revolution, Lind said, Gramsci proposed a ‘long march through the institutions’. Lind then repeated Minnicino’s rap sheet against Lukács, adding the salacious charge that as a commissar for the Hungarian Soviet Republic he had waged war on Western civilisation through ‘cultural terrorism’, including the establishment of sex education in schools. The Frankfurt School, Lind claimed, had dedicated its existence to ‘destroying Western culture’ through ‘psychological conditioning’. And Marcuse had dealt the death blow by turning all this into a programme for ‘polymorphous perversity’ and nihilistic student rebellion.

Unlike his reactionary epigones, Minnicino wasn’t merely ignorant. His distortions were examples, Woods writes, of ‘LaRouchean reading’, in which the elect were capable of disinterring the true meaning of a text from its surface dissimulations. For Lind and his followers, unschooled in the anfractuous hermeneutics of the cult, Minnicino’s analysis was the literal historical record. Similarly, The Death of the West (2002), by the arch-reactionary Pat Buchanan, recited the whole LaRouchean story, filtered through the Free Congress Foundation, without once consulting an original source.

There is an ambiguity here. Woods refuses the term ‘conspiracy theory’ and insists on treating Cultural Marxism seriously as a theory in its own right. This is too punctilious. Conspiracism does have recognisable features: the attribution of exaggerated power to tiny cliques in an attempt to explain social disorder; the imputation of pure malice to that group to explain its actions; and the mapping of the social totality onto the doings of evil cabals and their virtuous enemies. It is impeccably conservative in its logic, since the upshot is always that political crises can be solved by action, often violent, against the cabal. That sounds much like the logic that connects the LaRouche cult with the paleoconservative right.

What’s more, Woods argues that Lind wasn’t worried about the truth of the theory: it was true because it delegitimised the enemy. It needn’t be assumed that Lind was merely cynical: equivocation seems to be structural to this kind of belief. In his Brief History of Fascist Lies (2020), Federico Finchelstein suggests that fascists often believed their own lies because they ‘wanted to believe in them’. They fashioned a self-serving reality, which they thought conformed to ultimate truths, if not to the facts. The far right today seems to rely on such mechanisms of psychological equivocation as trolling irony and suspension of disbelief to sustain its ideological commitments. One can believe without literally, fully believing. That also seems to describe the attitude of the consumers of the ‘fake news’ and disinfotainment that circulate today, seemingly impervious to refutation.

What turned Weyrich’s monastic retreat into a full-throated offensive was the financial crash of 2008 and the election that November of Barack Obama as president. In Woods’s narrative, what had until then been a theory adopted by a small group of intellectuals working on the fringes became a mass phenomenon. Now, for the first time, there was a perceived threat to class interests. The rallying cry was a tirade delivered to camera in 2009 by the CNBC commentator Rick Santelli, live from the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The crisis, he said, wasn’t caused by deregulation but by ‘your neighbours’ and their reckless borrowing. He summoned ‘all you capitalists out there’ to a ‘tea party’. In the event, it wasn’t the capitalists who showed up but the middle classes. Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williams, in The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (2012), show that while the movement had some wealthy backers (and infrastructure such as the advocacy group FreedomWorks, founded by the Koch brothers), its grassroots were older, white, affluent Americans meeting in church halls. The founding myth of the movement was that Obama was a socialist elected to appropriate white property and hand it over to the Black voters they blamed for the 2008 crash. This offended a sense of ‘deservingness’ which, Woods says, was ironically a by-product of big government programmes of the kind reactionaries revile: the New Deal, for example, with its racial exclusions, contributed to the construction of an image of undeserving Blacks and deserving whites. How, the right now wondered, had America become a socialist dystopia? They turned for explanation variously to the Christian right, libertarians and paleoconservatives like Ron Paul and Pat Buchanan, propagandists for neoliberalism inspired by Friedrich von Hayek, polemicists for the John Birch Society like G. Edward Griffin – and then to the Cultural Marxism theory.

The emblematic text here was James Jaeger’s documentary Cultural Marxism: The Corruption of America, released in 2010, which had its premiere before an audience of Oathkeepers, a far-right militia, in Bozeman, Montana. It used a collection of reactionary talking heads (Buchanan, Paul, Griffin) to build the case that seditious Jews had hijacked and feminised the nation, using cinema and television to programme the American mind. The medium had shifted from radio to the screen, but the theory of transmission – essentially a theory of mesmerism – was unchanged. As Weyrich had, the documentary urged viewers to disconnect from the mainstream with its supply of Cultural Marxism and seek sustenance elsewhere.

Implicit in all this, Woods writes, was a ‘theory of cultural hegemony’ which functioned as both diagnosis and manifesto. The enemy had taken power through culture, so that was the way the right would regain control. Politics, the right-wing journalist Andrew Breitbart asserted, was downstream from culture. (On the European New Right, the same idea had the label ‘metapolitics’.) This took up a theme floated by the shock jock Rush Limbaugh in the early 1990s: the Democrats had used ‘Gramscianism’ to change America, and the right had to learn from their methods. A struggle over the cultural preconditions of political hegemony was launched by a swaggering counterculture, and waged outside legacy media, on the internet.

Social media was particularly conducive to this rearguard cultural action. Its only gatekeepers were overworked and underpaid content moderators, which left it wide open to the methods of cultural derailment – trolling, memeing, harassment and disinformation storms – favoured by this new right. And, as Jen Schradie documents in The Revolution That Wasn’t (2019), social media works particularly well for well-funded, centralised political operations wanting to use it to orchestrate waves of excitement and attention over rightist talking points. Turning Point USA, for instance, a right-wing think tank funded by dark money and conservative foundations, became a major vector for the spread of the Cultural Marxism theory and for agitation on culture war themes. As the theory spread it fused with more targeted panics over ‘gender ideology’, ‘wokeness’ and critical race theory. A new type of figure, one Woods calls the ‘conjunctural intellectual’, began to move between right-wing foundations, broadcast media and social media. Christopher Rufo, for instance, emerged from a group of institutions including the Heritage Foundation and the Claremont Institute as a documentary-maker and activist whose main claim to fame was deploying the arguments developed by Lind and others to explain critical race theory as a war on American values.

This pseudo-Gramscian turn may partly explain what Alberto Toscano has called the ‘intensely superstructural character’ of incipient fascism. Lacking any coherent political economy, it gathered momentum through the proliferation of new fronts in the culture war. Each new panic blamed leftist cultural tyranny, often citing the Frankfurt School, for liberal attitudes to race and gender, or for the mass protest movement against the police murder of George Floyd. And each incited an authoritarian desire to invigilate popular culture, sexuality and the ethnic composition of the US.

The​ Cultural Marxism theorists are, themselves, the Cultural Marxists. They have a stunningly crude theory of false consciousness. In a parody of parodies of Gramsci, they find that all political outcomes reflect a deeper cultural hegemony. Their cultural determinism is so total that, in narrating the origins of their nemesis, they scarcely linger over trivial matters such as capitalism, war, antisemitism or fascism, the evils that actually motivated their enemies. It is they, not their foes, who use culture as a cudgel. It is they, rather than the Marxists, who perceive popular consciousness as a set of pre-rational attachments and obediences that can be ‘conditioned’ one way or another.

Woods says that elitism was a ‘central organising element’ of the LaRouche cult, and this is certainly also true of Lind, Weyrich, Rufo and Breivik’s beliefs. They are so preoccupied with small circles of operators and funding networks – the foundation of establishment American politics – that they have no interest whatever in the political organisations supported by Lukács, Gramsci or the luminaries of the Frankfurt School, much less in their reflections on organisation. Mass movements like Black Lives Matter are intelligible only as the work of conspirators or, in LaRouchite terms, ‘counter-elites’. They despise the society they live in with a passion far less ambiguous than that of the gloomiest Frankfurt School seer. They are livid about student radicals, liberal professors, milquetoast corporate diversity, clumsy discourses of inclusion, social disobedience and evolving sexual mores, sometimes to the point of fantasising spectacular violence.

Alongside Breivik’s fantasy of fascist revenge massacres, and the imitative literary productions of men like Brenton Tarrant, who killed more than fifty people at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019, Woods places Lind’s Victoria, a novel set in a post-American landscape. It began as a short story, ‘Understanding Oklahoma’, published in the Washington Post in April 1995, a few days after Timothy McVeigh’s bombing. The narrator explains that by the ‘Year of Our Lord 2050’, the US has succumbed to hyperinflation and Aids and splintered into several warring nations. The Northern Confederation, representing Lind’s preferred idyll, is segregated, patriarchal and reactionary. The other nations represent various enemies: a feminist-Maoist Azanian Republic, a Hispanic Reconquista and a totalitarian country of Deep Greeners. Victoria expands this story into a 585-page novel published under the pseudonym ‘Thomas Hobbes’. It imagines the application of Lind’s model of ‘Fourth Generation’ irregular warfare – the sort used by al-Qaida or the Patriot movement in the US. The story culminates in a massacre: warriors from the Northern Confederation wielding Roman gladiuses and dressed in white surplices with red Crusader crosses descend on the liberal traitors at Dartmouth College. While a choir of monks sings Dies Irae (literally, Day of Wrath), the slaughter begins.

As Woods notes, violence in Lind’s sanguinary fantasia is a ‘strategy of depoliticisation’. By implication, to end all discord and antagonism, we need only kill all the Cultural Marxists. Woods, though, shows that the things they hate so much derived from material circumstances. Student radicalism, for instance, was a product of the Cold War expansion of universities, not Marcusean infiltration. The real problem, for Cultural Marxism propagandists, is capitalism. In a past era, they might have been reactionary anticapitalists. But, since their nostalgia is fixated on a frozen image of Cold War America, they can’t say anything critical about capitalism.

Society, they seem to feel, has become hostile and alien, ethical life has disintegrated and everyone heedlessly pursues individual pleasure. They cannot understand the reasons for this, and feel powerless before it. Lukács would have said they were experiencing reification, but from a standpoint unable to comprehend it. Instead they bring the dead, thingified world to life by ascribing to it a narrow, malevolent intentionality – a wicked conspiracy – and imagine possibilities hitherto dismissed as unrealistic. They find, in pastiche fantasies of ethnic purity, white nobility and patriarchal honour, an illusion of restored completeness. And in rhetorical and violent transgression, in authoritarian clampdowns, and even in massacres as yet only dreamed of, they find an illusion of freedom.





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